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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
KEVIN RANDALL WENZEL,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45930
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR-2017-23086

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kevin Randall Wenzel pleaded guilty to felony possession
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. After the parties stipulated to recommend the
district court retain jurisdiction, the district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with
two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. Mr. Wenzel participated in a “rider,” and the district
court subsequently suspended his sentence and placed him on supervised probation. On appeal,
mindful that his counsel joined the State’s sentencing recommendation, which was followed by
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the district court, Mr. Wenzel asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his
underlying sentence.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Kootenai County Sheriff’s Office deputies went to the Coeur d’Alene Casino in response
to a possible drug related call. (See R., pp.8, 16.) Casino security reported they had seen
Mr. Wenzel and two other people in a vehicle smoking what appeared to be pills. (See R., pp.8,
16.) When security contacted the occupants of the vehicle, Mr. Wenzel handed them a “tooter,”
a piece of a pen used to smoke drugs. (See R., pp.8-16.) The deputies interviewed the occupants
of the vehicle, and arrested Mr. Wenzel on an outstanding warrant for failure to appear in a
possession of paraphernalia and obstructing an officer case. (See R., pp.8, 16.)
The deputies then searched the vehicle, which was registered to Mr. Wenzel. (See
R., pp.8-9, 16-17.) Inside the vehicle, the deputies found multiple pieces of paraphernalia, as
well as tin foil with residue on it that tested presumptively positive for heroin. (See R., pp.8-9,
16-17.)

The deputies also found a bag containing marijuana and a substance that tested

presumptively positive for methamphetamine. (See R., pp.9, 17.) The other two occupants of
the vehicle stated the marijuana and methamphetamine belonged to Mr. Wenzel. (See R., pp.9,
17.)
The State charged Mr. Wenzel by Information with one count of possession of a
controlled substance, felony, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), for the heroin, one count of possession of a
controlled substance, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(3), for the marijuana, and one count of
possession of paraphernalia, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2734A(1). (R., pp.37-39.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Wenzel agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of
felony possession of a controlled substance, with the substance changed from heroin to
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methamphetamine, and the State agreed to dismiss the two misdemeanor charges.

(See

R., pp.44-45, 48-52; Tr., p.4, L.11 – p.5, L.17.) The State agreed to recommend a unified
sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and with the district court retaining jurisdiction.
(See R., p.50; Tr., p.6, Ls.1-5.) Mr. Wenzel would stipulate to retained jurisdiction, and would
be able to recommend a different underlying sentence. (See R., p.50; Tr., p.6, Ls.6-10.)
The parties also agreed to waive the presentence report. (See R., p.50; Tr., p.6, Ls.1112.) At the change of plea and sentencing hearing, the district court asked Mr. Wenzel if he
wanted to give up his right to have a presentence report “because you just want to be able to
recommend and hopefully get going on a rider right away?”

(See Tr., p.10, Ls.10-17.)

Mr. Wenzel replied: “Yes, your Honor. It’s due to I have employment out there still and my
employer is willing to wait until the fall; first, second week of September, if I was to get back,
you know, in that time, give or take, that they would hire me back up full time and I can keep my
position.”

(Tr., p.10, Ls.18-23.)

The district court accepted Mr. Wenzel’s guilty plea.

(Tr., p.17, Ls.12-17.)
Mr. Wenzel’s counsel then informed the district court Mr. Wenzel had “a pretty healthy
misdemeanor history,” as well as one previous felony conviction for trafficking between two and
seven grams of heroin. (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-7.) Defense counsel also explained that Mr. Wenzel
“never had the benefit of a rider.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.7-8.) Additionally, Mr. Wenzel’s counsel stated
Mr. Wenzel “would be able to maintain his employment if he were to be released in September,
which is about the time frame that he would likely be released if he does well on his rider. And
he’s also never had any significant treatment, so we’re hoping he can benefit from the treatment
programs of the rider program.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.12-18.) The district court allowed Mr. Wenzel to
waive his right to a presentence report. (See Tr., p.18, Ls.20-23.)
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The State recommended the district court impose a unified sentence of four years, with
two years fixed, and with the district court retaining jurisdiction. (See Tr., p.19, Ls.16-23.) The
State noted that Mr. Wenzel had served a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for the prior
trafficking conviction. (See Tr., p.20, Ls.9-15.) Further, the State told the district court: “The
defendant has taken responsibility for his actions. And I would just like to echo the comments of
counsel: Even though he’s been to prison, he has not had the benefit of a rider or felony
probation and so I do think that he could benefit from that.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-15.) The State also
indicated the recommended sentence and rider would serve the objectives of protecting the
community and deterrence. (See Tr., p.21, Ls.16-25.)
Mr. Wenzel’s counsel addressed the district court as follows: “We are joining in this
recommendation from the State and I would, frankly, echo the State’s comments, your Honor,
and also ask your Honor to consider my previous comments. I think that a rider is an appropriate
resolution for this matter.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.3-8.) In response to the district court’s question on
when he was paroled in the prior case, Mr. Wenzel clarified that he instead topped out his fiveyear sentence. (See Tr., p.22, L.10 – p.23, L.1.) Mr. Wenzel explained he had not had a chance
to do treatment. (See Tr., p.23, Ls.2-6.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.54-56; Tr., p.24, Ls.1-14.) The Idaho Department of Correction
placed Mr. Wenzel on a Cognitive Behavioral Interventions for Substance Abuse and Thinking
for a Change “rider” at North Idaho Correctional Institution.

(See R., p.53.)

Later, after

conducting a jurisdictional review hearing, the district court suspended Mr. Wenzel’s sentence
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and placed him on supervised probation for a period of two years. (Judgment on Retained
Jurisdiction, Sept. 6, 2018.)1
Meanwhile, Mr. Wenzel filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment – Retained
Jurisdiction. (R., pp.59-62.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed Mr. Wenzel’s underlying unified
sentence of four years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Wenzel following his plea of guilty to
possession of a controlled substance?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Mr. Wenzel’s Underlying Unified
Sentence Of Four Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Wenzel Following His Plea Of
Guilty To Possession Of A Controlled Substance
Mindful that his counsel joined the State’s sentencing recommendation, which was
followed by the district court, Mr. Wenzel asserts the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed his underlying unified sentence. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving “due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Wenzel does not assert that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in

1

The Judgment on Retained Jurisdiction is a subject of Mr. Wenzel’s Motion to Augment, filed
contemporaneously with this Appellant’s Brief.
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order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Wenzel must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria
or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the

individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing.

Id.

An appellate court, “[w]hen reviewing the length of a

sentence . . . consider[s] the defendant’s entire sentence.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726
(2007). The reviewing court will “presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant’s probable term of confinement.” Id.
The invited error doctrine, which applies to sentencing decisions, estops a party from
asserting an error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error; one may not
complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in. State v. Edghill, 155 Idaho 846, 849
(Ct. App. 2014.) “In short, invited errors are not reversible.” Id.
Here, mindful of the invited error doctrine and the fact his counsel told the district court,
“[w]e are joining in this recommendation from the State . . .” (see Tr., p.22, Ls.3-8), which was
followed by the district court, Mr. Wenzel asserts the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed his underlying unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, because the
sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. Here, even the State argued, “The
defendant has taken responsibility for his actions.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-12.) Moreover, Mr. Wenzel
had employment waiting for him upon his release. (See Tr., p.10, Ls.18-23, p.18, Ls.12-15.)
Further, Mr. Wenzel was interested in treatment, which he had not had the option of pursuing
before. (See Tr., p.23, Ls.2-9.) Thus, Mr. Wenzel asserts the district court abused its discretion
when it imposed his underlying unified sentence.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Wenzel respectfully requests that this Court reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 19th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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Administrative Assistant
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